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Editor's Note: The respondent's brief
in this case was not scheduled to be
filed until after PREVIEW went to
press.
IssuE
Does an auto manufacturer's com-
pliance with Standard 208 of the
National Traffic and Safety Motor
Vehicle Act pre-empt a defective
design lawsuit under state law?
FACTS
Alexis Geier, a minor at the time of
the accident, was driving her par-
ents' 1987 Honda Accord when she
crashed into a tree and suffered
injuries. The Honda did not have a
driver's side air bag. For cars manu-
factured between Sept. 1, 1986, and
Sept. 1, 1987, the inclusion of a dri-
ver's side air bag was one of several
passive restraint "options" from
which car manufacturers could
choose in order to comply with safe-
ty standards promulgated under the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act (hereafter "the Safety
Act"). Specifically, at the time of the
Geier accident, Standard 208
approved two types of passive
restraint systems-automatic seat
belts or air bags. Since the Geiers'
1987 Honda did not have a driver's
side air bag, they filed suit against
the American Honda Motor
Company in U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia alleging
product liability based on the car's
defective design.
Two provisions of the Safety Act are
relevant in ascertaining the effect of
Standard 208 on state law. The first
provision is 15 USC § 1392(d) [now
codified at 49 USC § 30103(b)(1)],
which provides "whenever a federal
motor vehicle safety standard ... is
in effect, no State or political subdi-
vision of a State shall have any
authority either to establish, or to
continue in effect, with respect to
any motor vehicle or item of motor
vehicle equipment any safety stan-
dard applicable to the same aspect
of performance of such vehicle or
item of equipment which is not
identical to the federal standards."
(Continued on Page 166)
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The second provision is 15 USC §
1397(k) [now codified at 49 USC §
30103(e)], a so-called savings
clause, which provides that "compli-
ance with any federal motor vehicle
safety standard issued under this
subchapter does not exempt any
person from any liability under
common law."
Honda moved for summary judg-
ment in the district court. The basis
of the motion was that the lawsuit
was pre-empted by the Safety Act
and Safety Standard 208, which
governs the passive safety restraint
that automobile manufacturers are
required to install. The district
court granted summary judgment in
favor of Honda. In the district
court's view, states lack the authori-
ty to require air bags. In the court's
opinion, Section 1392(d) and
Standard 208 expressly pre-empt
such a requirement for car manu-
facturers. The district court rea-
soned that to permit Geier to recov-
er under a common-law tort theory
claim might establish a safety stan-
dard that was not identical to
Standard 208, and therefore viola-
tive of Section 1392(d).
The Geiers appealed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. On appeal, the Geiers
contended that the district court
erred in granting summary judg-
ment because Section 1397(k)
expressly preserved all common-law
claims against pre-emption. The
Geiers also asserted that the term
standards in Section 1392(d)
applies only to state legislation or
regulation and not to state product-
liability actions. Honda, on the
other hand, maintained that the
summary judgment was appropriate
because the Safety Act either
expressly or impliedly pre-empted
the Geiers' lawsuit. Honda argued
that a verdict in favor of the Geiers
would conflict with the Safety
Standard 208 requirement, which
gave auto manufacturers a choice.
The court of appeals affirmed the
district court's decision. 166 F.3d
1236 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
The court of appeals found no
express pre-emption by Section
1392(d) for two reasons. First, the
broad language of Section 1397(k)
indicated to the court that Congress
did not wish to deprive plaintiffs of
all their remedies at common law.
Second, because of the apparent
conflict between Sections 1392(d)
and 1397(k), it was difficult for the
court to discern from the Safety Act
a clear and manifest purpose of
Congress to pre-empt this lawsuit.
Notwithstanding its conclusion on
the issue of express pre-emption,
however, the court of appeals con-
cluded that the Safety Act impliedly
pre-empted the Geiers' lawsuit. The
court explained that implied pre-
emption occurs when it is impossi-
ble for a private party to comply
with both state and federal require-
ments, or where state law stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress. The
court reasoned that a state jury ver-
dict that held an auto manufacturer
liable for not installing air bags
would create a conflict with Safety
Standard 208. A successful "no air-
bag" lawsuit would mean that an
automobile without a driver's side
air bag was defectively designed.
Congress, however, had delegated
the authority to prescribe specific
motor vehicle safety standards to
the secretary of transportation. The
secretary of transportation explicitly
rejected requiring air bags in all
cars on the ground that a more flex-
ible approach (providing options)
would better serve public policy.
Therefore, the Geiers' lawsuit claim-
ing a defective design was impliedly
pre-empted because potential
common-law liability would inter-
fere with the regulatory methods
chosen by the federal government
to achieve the Safety Act's stated
goals.
Currently, six circuit courts of
appeal (including the Geier deci-
sion) have analyzed the issue of
pre-emption under the Safety Act
when plaintiffs have brought defec-
tive-design claims based on the
absence of air bags. In each case,
Safety Standard 208 did not require
air bags for the model years in ques-
tion but rather presented them as
one of several options from which
the manufacturers could choose.
Five of the six circuit courts have
held that the state-law defective
design claims were impliedly pre-
empted. The Ninth Circuit has held
that the claims are expressly pre-
empted. See Harris v. Ford Motor
Company, 110 F.3d 1410 (9th Cir.
1997); Geier v. American Honda
Motor Company, 166 F.3d 1236
(D.C. Cir. 1999); Wood v. General
Motors Corporation, 865 F.2d 395
(1st Cir. 1988); Montag v. Honda
Motor Company, 75 F.3d 1414 (10th
Cir. 1996); Pokorny v. Ford Motor
Company, 902 F.2d 1116 (3rd Cir.
1990); Taylor v. General Motors
Corporation, 875 F.2d 816 (11th
Cir. 1989).
Contemporaneously, however, a
number of state supreme courts
have reached the opposite result on
the same pre-emption question. In
Drattel v. Toyota Motor Corpor-
ation, 699 N.E.2d 376 (N.Y 1998),
the New York Court of Appeals con-
cluded that the Safety Act does not
expressly pre-empt state-law defec-
tive design lawsuits. The court rea-
soned that there is no implied pre-
emption because it is not impossible
for an auto manufacturer to comply
with both federal and state law. In
Monroe v. Gallatti, 938 P.2d 1114
(Ariz. 1997), the Arizona Supreme
Court concluded that by virtue of
the savings clause contained in
Section 1397(k), Congress intended
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to forbid regulatory standards in
conflict with federal law but did
not intend to preclude claims of
common-law liability based on a
manufacturer's failure to exceed the
federal minimum standards. Finally,
in Tebbetts v. Ford Motor Company,
665 A.2d 345 (NH. 1995), the New
Hampshire Supreme Court found no
pre-emption under the Safety Act or
Safety Standard 208 to preclude a
common-law product liability action
for defective design. The court rea-
soned that compliance with a leg-
islative enactment or an administra-
tion regulation does not prevent a
finding of negligence where a rea-
sonable person would take addition-
al precautions.
CASE ANALYSIS
In 1966, Congress passed the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act in an effort to establish
regulations for vehicle performance
that would provide basic and mini-
mum safety for vehicles sold in the
United States. The Safety Act con-
tained both a pre-emption provision
(15 USC § 1392(d)) and a savings
clause (15 USC § 1397(k)).
Simultaneously, with the passage of
the Safety Act, Congress authorized
the establishment of a government
agency to develop and promulgate
safety regulations, which became
known as the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA). Safety Standard 208 was
one of the regulations promulgated
by the NHTSA. Under Safety
Standard 208, the installation of a
driver's side air bag was one of the
options available to auto manufac-
turers to satisfy the safety require-
ment of a passive restraint system.
Rather than a driver's side air bag,
the Geiers' automobile contained a
manual 3-point lap belt and shoul-
der harness. The issue in this case
is whether Honda's compliance with
Safety Standard 208 pre-empts a
defective design lawsuit under state
common law.
Under the supremacy clause of the
Constitution, the laws of the United
States shall be the supreme law of
the land. U.S. Constitution Article
VI, Clause 2. In applying this clause,
courts have identified three ways in
which a federal statute or regulation
can pre-empt state law: first, by
express pre-emption; second, by
"field" pre-emption, in which
Congress regulates the field so
extensively that it clearly intends
the subject area to be controlled by
federal law; and third, by implied
pre-emption, which applies when a
state law conflicts with a federal
statute or regulation. Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
In addition, the Supreme Court has
identified two presumptions that the
courts must consider when invoking
the doctrine of pre-emption. First,
courts must start with a presump-
tion against pre-emption in areas
where states have traditionally exer-
cised their historic police power.
Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470
(1996). Second, in every pre-
emption case, the purpose of Con-
gress is the ultimate touchstone. Id.
The Geiers assert that in determin-
ing whether federal law pre-empts a
state cause of action, the court's
sole task is to ascertain the intent of
Congress. In this regard, the deter-
mination should be made in light of
a strong presumption against pre-
emption that should only be over-
come by a clear manifestation of
congressional intent to the contrary.
In this light, petitioners assert that
it is clear that Congress did not
intend to pre-empt common-law
tort claims under the Safety Act.
Indeed, the two provisions of the
Safety Act that relate to Congress's
intent with respect to pre-
emption-the Pre-emption Provision
(Section 1392(d)) and the Savings
Clause (Section 1397(k))-reveal
that the state common-law claims
are expressly preserved, not
pre-empted.
The Geiers assert that the language
of Section 1392(d) indicates that
Congress intended to pre-empt only
state legislative or administrative
safety standards that are not identi-
cal to the federal safety standards
governing the same aspects of motor
vehicle performance. Therefore, the
Safety Act's express pre-emption
provision does not encompass or
anticipate common-law tort claims.
Any doubt on this point should be
dispelled by Section 1397(k), which
provides in sweeping and unambigu-
ous terms that "compliance with
any ... safety standard ... does not
exempt any person from liability
under common law." In light of the
presumptions against pre-emption
and the plain language of the
Safety Act, the Geiers conclude that
their state common-law claim is
not expressly pre-empted by the
Safety Act.
Despite the fact that five circuits
have held otherwise, petitioners also
assert that their defective-design
claim is not impliedly pre-empted
by the Safety Act and Safety
Standard 208. Petitioners assert that
where Congress has spoken directly
and clearly on the issue of pre-
emption, as it has in the Safety Act,
there can be no finding of implied
pre-emption. Petitioners believe
that because the Safety Act contains
both an express pre-emption provi-
sion and an express savings provi-
sion, any inquiry into implied pre-
emption is precluded.
Assuming arguendo that the Court
could reach the issue of implied pre-
emption, the Geiers assert that
there is no implied pre-emption
because their common-law tort
claim does not conflict with the
Safety Act or Standard 208. Implied
pre-emption applies only when it is
impossible for a private party to
comply with both state and federal
requirements, or when state law
would frustrate the full purpose and
(Continued on Page 168)
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objective of Congress. Impossibility
is not an issue in this case, since
Standard 208 would permit the
installation of a driver's side air bag
in the Geiers' 1987 Honda.
Similarly, the petitioner's claims do
not frustrate any congressional pur-
pose. The purpose of the Safety Act
and Standard 208 is to create safer
vehicles. The Geiers assert that the
preservation of state common-law
claims aids the accomplishment and
execution of the congressional pur-
pose. In fact, petitioners assert that
a finding of implied pre-emption
would frustrate the congressional
purpose of creating safer vehicles.
The Geiers assert that their
common-law tort claim is also
consistent with the goals underlying
Safety Standard 208. They argue
that the NHTSA promulgated Safety
Standard 208 as a minimum stan-
dard and left the common law
undisturbed. The Geiers note that
according to the NHTSA, the most
effective system was an air bag plus
a lap belt and shoulder harness. The
Geiers also note that the NHTSA
explicitly relied on incentives to
encourage the use of air bags,
including the threat of potential lia-
bility for a deficient system. The
Geiers assert that their attempt to
hold Honda liable for failing to
install an air bag is in perfect har-
mony with Congress' approach.
Finally, the Geiers assert that their
common-law state tort claim is con-
sistent with NHTSA's goal of permit-
ting auto manufacturers to experi-
ment with designs to develop safer
systems. The Geiers assert that the
common-law tort system actually
encourages manufacturers to experi-
ment with safer product designs.
Therefore, the petitioner's common-
law claim is entirely consistent
with, and actually advances, the
goals underlying Safety Standard
208.
Honda believes that the Geiers'
common-law tort claim is expressly
pre-empted by Section 1392(d). It
argues that the coverage of Section
1392(d) is very broad. First of all,
Honda asserts that at a minimum,
the language of Section 1392(d)
restricts a state's authority to enact
legislation or regulations that affir-
matively require car manufacturers
to adopt standards not identical to
Safety Standard 208. In other
words, a state could not require, by
statute or regulation, that car manu-
facturers install air bags in automo-
biles when Standard 208 makes
them only an option. Further,
Honda asserts that the term stan-
dard in Section 1392(d) also applies
to the requirements imposed by
common-law tort verdicts.
Honda argues that the Supreme
Court has observed that state regu-
lation can be effectively asserted
through a damage award. In other
words, the term standard is broad
enough to include duties established
by state tort law. Common-law lia-
bility could therefore be viewed as
constituting a "standard" that con-
flicts with Safety Standard 208. In
Honda's view, because Standard 208
allows car manufacturers the option
of choosing an air bag, a jury verdict
in favor of the Geiers on a claimed
design defect would require car
manufacturers to comply with a dif-
ferent standard. Section 1392(d)
expressly prohibits such a require-
ment and therefore expressly pre-
empts the Geiers' lawsuit.
Honda further asserts that the
Safety Act impliedly pre-empts the
Geiers' lawsuit. Safety Standard 208
governs the use of air bags in 1987
model year cars. Although the
Standard does not mandate or for-
bid the use of air bags, it presents
them as one of several options from
which manufacturers may choose.
Honda argues that a successful "no
air bag" claim would mean that an
automobile without an air bag was
defectively designed. Congress, how-
ever, delegated authority to pre-
scribe specific motor vehicle safety
standards to the secretary of trans-
portation. When the secretary pro-
mulgated Safety Standard 208, she
rejected an "all air bag" rule out of
concern that, notwithstanding the
safety benefits of air bags, the public
might respond negatively to the
unfamiliar technology if it was
required in all cars. In the secre-
tary's view, gradually phasing in air
bags would potentially address
"unfounded" fears among members
of the public that air bags were
unsafe.
At the same time, the secretary was
concerned that not affording manu-
facturers discretion to install an
automatic occupant-restraint sys-
tem ran the risk of impeding the
development of more effective pro-
tective systems. Thus, a perfor-
mance standard making air bags one
of several options car manufacturers
could choose from in order to com-
ply with the passive restraint
requirements of Standard 208,
rather than mandating specific use
of one safety device, would advance
public safety in two respects-first,
by allowing consumers to adjust to
the new technology, and second, by
permitting experimentation with
designs for even safer systems.
Honda concludes that allowing
design-defect claims based on the
absence of air bags would frustrate
the department's policy of encourag-
ing public acceptance of air bag
technology and manufacturers'
experimentation with better
passive-restraint systems. There-
fore, the Geiers' lawsuit must be
implicitly pre-empted because
potential common-law liability
claims could interfere with the regu-
latory method chosen by the gov-
ernment to achieve the Safety Act's
stated goals.
Issue No. 3
SIGNIFICANCE
Generally, a citizen injured by a
manufacturer's product is entitled to
her "day in court." However, where
Congress has legislated in a particu-
lar area, a state and its citizens may
be precluded from acting in that
area by the federal pre-emption doc-
trine. The federal pre-emption doc-
trine provides that federal law can
pre-empt state law either expressly
or impliedly. Congress "expressly"
pre-empts state law by a clause in
the legislation that attempts to
define the extent to which a partic-
ular federal law will pre-empt state
law. Congress "impliedly" pre-empts
state law through federal legislation
that occupies a field or conflicts
with state law. Traditionally, if the
federal law at issue contained an
express pre-emption provision, the
Supreme Court analyzed the lan-
guage of the pre-emption clause and
did not purport to consider implied
pre-emption theories. Recent state
supreme court decisions have fol-
lowed the U.S. Supreme Court's tra-
ditional approach. Recent federal
cases have suggested a shift away
from the traditional approach and
have found implied pre-emption
despite the presence of an express
pre-emption clause. This case will
provide the Supreme Court with an
opportunity to further clarify its
position on the federal pre-emption
doctrine.
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